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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
PlaintifCAppellee 
vs. CaseNo.20100668-CA 
LONNY HIGH 
Defendant/Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue. At trial in this case, the District Court permitted the State to cross-examine 
Appellant Lonny High concerning his participation, as a member of the PVL gang, in 
gang fights that were unrelated to the charges in this case, as well the methods of gaining 
status in the PVL gang through violent actions. The issue presented in this case is 
whether the District Court erred in admitting this evidence over High's objection that the 
evidence was inadmissible under Utah R. Evid. 404(b). 
Standards of Review. This Court reviews a trial court's decision to admit 
evidence under Utah R. Evid. 404(b) for an abuse of discretion. State v. Widdison, 2001 
UT 60, % 42, 28 P.3d 1278; State v. Decorso. 1999 UT 57, f 19, 993 P.2d 837. In doing 
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i 
so, this Court reviews the record to determine whether the admission of other bad acts 
evidence was scrupulously examined by the trial judge in the proper exercise of its 
discretion. State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, f 16, 6 P.3d 1120. The failure of a 
trial court to undertake a scrupulous examination in connection with the admission of i 
prior bad act evidence constitutes an abuse of discretion. State v. Webster, 2000 UT App 
238, % 11, 32 P.3d 976. However, this Court will not reverse a jury verdict based on the 
erroneous admission of evidence unless the defendant has been prejudiced as a result. 
State v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 184, f 34, 163 P.3d 695. 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All controlling statutory provisions are attached hereto in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case 
Lonny High appeals from the judgment of the Honorable Lynn W. Davis, Fourth 
District Court, after his convictions of one count of party to the offense of aggravated 
assault (in concert with two or more persons), a second degree felony, and one count of 
party to the offense of riot, a third degree felony. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Lonny High was charged by Criminal Information filed on October 30, 2009 in 
Fourth District Court with: Count 1—party to the offense of aggravated assault (in 
concert with two or more persons), a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-5-103 and 76-2-202, Count 2—party to the offense of aggravated assault (in 
concert with two or more persons), a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
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Ann. §§ 76-5-103 and 76-2-202; Count 3—party to the offense of riot, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-101; and Count 4—party to the offense of 
obstructing justice, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306. 
(R.3-1.) 
Count 4 was dismissed at a preliminary hearing on January 20, 2010, and the 
District Court found probable cause to bind the three remaining charges over for trial. 
(R. 26; 208-207; 231:55; 233:4.) High pled not guilty to the three remaining charges at 
the preliminary hearing. (R. 231:56-57.) 
On July 12, 2010, High filed a demand for notice of any evidence that the State 
sought to introduce under Utah R. Evid. 404(b). (R. 63-62.) On July 13, 2010, High 
filed a motion to exclude any evidence of prior crimes for impeachment purposes. (R. 
81-75.) 
The State responded to High's demand for notice of 404(b) evidence on July 27, 
2010. (R. 199-192.) The State provided notice that it intended to introduce the following 
evidence at trial: 
1. That [High] is a self admitted member of and associated with Provo Vatos 
Locos ("PVL".) 
2. That [High] has PVL tattoed [sic] on his body. 
3. That [High's co-defendant Saul Cristobal] is a self admitted member of and 
associated with PVL. 
4. That on May 20, 2009 [High] participated as a party to the offense of Assault, 
substantial bodily injury, in concert with two or more persons, a third degree 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i 
felony while in the boundaries of the Provo River Parkway. 
5. That [High] knowingly committed the crime in concert with fellow gang 
members from PVL to include [co-defendant Cristobal]. 
6. That Provo River parkway is PVL claimed territory. ( 
(R. 199-198.) The State argued that all of the above evidence was admissible under Utah 
R. Evid. 404(b). (R. 195-193.) 
Also on July 27, 2010, the State responded to High's motion to exclude evidence 
of prior crimes for impeachment purposes, arguing that the District Court should permit 
the State to establish that High had previously been convicted of a felony, but that the 
District Court should exclude evidence of the name of the felony for which High was 
convicted and the factual basis of the crime. (R. 204-202.) 
On the first day of trial, August 5, 2010, before jury selection, the District Court 
ruled that evidence of High's felony conviction would be inadmissible unless High 
testified at trial. (R. 233:12-13.) The District Court also ruled that evidence that High 
had the letters "PVL" tattooed on his body, and that someone yelled "PVL" during the 
course of the alleged crime, was admissible. (R. 233:5-13.) 
At that time, High also asked the District Court to rule whether testimony 
regarding the meaning of the acronym PVL, or the nature and activities of the PVL gang, 
would be admissible. (R. 233:10-11.) The State argued that such evidence would be 
admissible if High testified at trial. (R. 233:11-12.) The District Court declined to rule 
on the issue at that time. (R. 233:12.) 
On the morning of the second day of trial, August 6, 2010, High notified the 
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District Court that he intended to testify. (R. 234:256.) The District Court then ruled that 
the State could establish, pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 609(a), the fact of High's prior felony 
conviction on cross-examination, but was prohibited from introducing evidence of the 
name or factual basis of the crime. (R. 234:268-269.) 
The District Court also addressed the issue of gang evidence. (R. 234:265-274.) 
The District Court ruled that the State could establish that High and co-defendant 
Cristobal were members of PVL, but declined to make a definitive ruling as to the 
admissibility of other evidence regarding PVL. (R. 234:270-274.) The District Court 
instead instructed High to object during trial if the State sought to introduce inadmissible 
evidence concerning PVL. (R. 234:270-274.) 
High testified on direct and cross-examination that he said the letters "PVL" after 
the alleged incident, that PVL was a gang, that he was a member of PVL, that he had the 
letters "PVL" tattooed on his hand, and that co-defendant Cristobal was a former member 
of PVL. (R. 234:298-29.) After these facts were established on cross-examination, the 
State asked, "Okay, now this organization, PVL, what does it do; what is it about?" (R. 
234:305.) High objected to this question in a sidebar conference on the grounds of Rules 
404(b) and 403. (R. 234:305-306, 358-360.) 
High's objection was overruled, and over High's ongoing objection, the State 
established that High had been personally involved in illegal fights between PVL and 
rival gangs, and also established that members of PVL gained status in the gang through 
violent actions. (R. 234:305-309, 399.) 
High made a record of the District Court's ruling in the sidebar conference at the 
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close of evidence. (R. 234:358-360, 362-365.) He argued that the admission of 
evidence, over his objection, concerning his violent gang activities unrelated to the crime 
charged at trial was inadmissible character evidence under Utah R. Evid. 404(b), and had 
so prejudiced the jury as to warrant a mistrial. (R. 234:358-360, 362-365.) t 
The District Court denied High's motion for a mistrial, and permitted High to draft 
a curative jury instruction. (R. 234:366-368.) 
At the conclusion of trial on August 6, 2010, the State dismissed Count 2, and 
High was convicted of Count 1—party to the offense of aggravated assault (in concert 
with two or more persons), a second degree felony, and Count 3—party to the offense of 
riot, a third degree felony. (R. 222; 223; 234:353.) 
Immediately following trial, High was sentenced to 1 to 15 years in prison on the 
aggravated assault conviction, and 0 to 5 years in prison on the riot conviction. (R. 222; 
234:414.) 
High filed a timely notice of appeal on August 10, 2010. (R. 229.) 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The alleged victims in this case were Desi and Emilio Maciel. At trial, Desi and 
Emilio Maciel testified that they were assaulted by High, co-defendant Cristobal, and a 
third unidentified individual on the Provo River Trail on October 24, 2009. Earlier in the 
day, Desi and a friend had encountered these three individuals on the Provo River Trial, 
and Desi testified that the three individuals detained his friend and demanded cigarettes. 
(R. 233:129, 177-178, 180-181, 193.) 
Desi testified that approximately an hour later he was by himself on the Provo 
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River Trail when he encountered the three individuals again. (R. 233:182-183.) As Desi 
rode by on a skateboard, Cristobal asked "What are you looking at?" (R. 233:182-183.) 
Desi and Emilio testified that at approximately 11:00 p.m. they were walking 
home on the Provo River Trail when they again encountered the third unidentified 
individual. (R. 233:129-130, 184.) As the unidentified individual passed them, he 
whistled and was joined by High and Cristobal: the three then began to follow Desi and 
Emilio. (R. 233:129, 133, 153, 206.) 
Desi and Emilio asked the three individuals to stop following them. (R. 233:134.) 
Desi called them "wannabe gangsters." (R. 233:134, 188.) 
Cristobal then picked up a rock. (R. 233:136, 159, 185.) Cristobal and the 
unidentified individual rushed Desi and pushed him to the ground. (R. 233:136, 162, 
168.) Cristobal hit Desi in the head with the rock, and the unidentified individual hit Desi 
in the head with a stick. (R. 233:185-187, 199.) 
Meanwhile, High threw two punches at Emilio Maciel. (R. 233:137, 161.) When 
neither punch connected, Emilio struck High with his knee and threw him to the ground. 
(R. 233:140, 161-162.) Emilio then pulled the unidentified individual, who was still 
assaulting Desi, to his feet. (R. 233:140.) The unidentified individual struck Emilio in 
the head with a stick. (R. 233:140.) 
All three assailants then ran off. (R. 233:143.) As they ran off, the assailants 
yelled the letters "PVL." (R. 233:143.) After the assailants had fled, Desi and Emilio 
called the police. (R. 233:144-145.) Police identified High and Cristobal as potential 
suspects, and that same evening, Officer Troy Cook drove Desi and Emilio to two nearby 
7 
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residences, where they identified High and Cristobal. (R. 148, 220, 229.) 
i 
High's testimony at trial contradicted Desi's and Emilio's testimony. High 
testified that on the evening of October 24, 2009, he and Cristobal were approached by 
an unidentified man on the Provo River Trail who asked for cigarettes. (R. 234:277-280.) ( 
When they told him they didn't have any cigarettes, the man proceeded down the trail 
and approached Desi Maciel and his friend. (234:283-285.) As High and Cristobal 
passed by, Cristobal remarked to Desi and his friend that the man was drunk. (R. 
234:285.) 
Approximately fifteen minutes later, High observed Desi ride by on a skateboard, i 
this time holding a big stick. (R. 234:286-287.) No words were exchanged between 
Desi, High or Cristobal during this encounter. (R. 234:286-287.) 
Later that evening, High left Cristobal on the Provo River Trail, but shortly 
thereafter observed Desi and Emilio approach Cristobal. (R. 234:287-291.) (R. 234:289-
291.) High returned to the trail to rejoin Cristobal, and observed that Desi was carrying a 
pool cue and was taunting Cristobal. (R. 234:291-292.) 
Desi seemed agitated, and High bent down to pick up a rock in case he needed to 
defend himself. (R. 234:293-296.) While High was picking up the rock, Desi charged 
him. (R. 234:296.) High hit Desi with the rock, and Desi dropped the pool cue. (R. 
234:296-297.) High picked up the pool cue and hit Desi in the head with it. (R. 
234:297.) High then felt Emilio punch him from the back, so he stood up and hit Emilio 
in the head with the pool cue. (R. 234:297.) High testified that Cristobal had no weapon 
and was not involved in the fight. (R. 234:296, 298.) When the altercation had ended, 
Q 
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High said the letters "PVL." (R. 234:298.) 
Credibility was a significant issue at trial. Desi, the primary alleged victim in the 
case, testified on direct examination that he had a felony conviction for possession with 
intent to distribute, and that he could not recall any other criminal convictions. (R. 
233:189-190.) However, on cross-examination, High established that Desi also had 
convictions for burglary and shoplifting, which Desi testified that he had forgotten about 
on direct examination. (R. 233:201-202.) Desi also testified on re-direct examination 
that his burglary conviction arose from an incident in which he stole money from his 
brother Emilio, the other alleged victim in the case, to buy drugs. (R. 233:208-209.) 
High, on the other hand, testified that he had a felony conviction, but did not 
explain the nature of the conviction because the District Court had ruled that evidence 
pertaining to the conviction, other than the fact of conviction, was inadmissible. (R. 
234:268-269, 302-303.) Additionally, High admitted that he lied to police when 
questioned about his involvement in the alleged incident and asked his cousin to give a 
false alibi for him. (R. 234:300-301; 312-313.) 
The State also established on cross-examination that High had the letters "PVL" 
tattooed on his hand, that High had been a member of PVL for approximately four years, 
that Cristobal was a former member of PVL, and that High and Cristobal were involved 
in PVL together during most of the time High had been a member. (R. 234:304-305.) 
After establishing these facts, the State asked "Okay, now this organization, PVL, 
what does it do; what is it about?" (R. 234:305.) High objected to this question on the 
grounds of Utah R. Evid. 404(b) and was overruled. (R. 234:305-306, 399.) Over High's 
Q 
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ongoing objection, the State then elicited testimony concerning High's prior involvement 
i 
in unrelated gang fights, and testimony establishing that members of PVL gained status 
through violence: 
Q. Mr. High, back to PVL, it's an organization that exists today. You're a I 
member of it? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Okay, does this organization do any charitable work? 
A. No. 
Q. Is this organization involved in any business enterprise? i 
A. No. 
Q. What is the purpose of this organization as you understand it? 
A. I don't understand your question. 
Q. What is the whole purpose of PVL being an organization? Why does it exist? 
A. It's just a gang. 
Q. A gang? ^ ^ 
A. Yeah. 
Q. What is their purpose? 
A. I just don't understand what you're saying. 
Q. Well, you know, Kodak, you've heard of that? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay, how about Macintosh Computers, Apple Computers; you've heard of 
that. That's a corporation. They're - they exist to do business. 
m 
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A. All right. 
Q. The Red Cross, you've heard of them, right? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. They exist to do charitable work. Why does PVL exist? 
A. Do graffiti and stuff. 
Q. Is there any territory associated with PVL? In the name it has "Provo." Is 
there a territorial boundary for PVL? 
A. Provo. 
Q. Okay, does the organization do anything to be able to protect or to be able to 
assert itself within that boundary? 
A. We have conflicts with rival gangs. 
Q. "Conflicts," meaning? 
A. Fights. 
Q. Fights? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Willingly coming together to meet a rival gang to fight? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Do you understand th^t that's probably illegal? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. But the organization doesn't have a problem with that? 
A. No. 
Q. So you participated in that kind of similar activity before? 
11 
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A. Yeah. 
i 
Q. So the organization exists to fight rival gangs? 
A. Yeah. 
I 
Q. Are there differing - differing degrees of people within PVL, or is everybody 
much - pretty much equal? 
A. Pretty much equal. 
Q. Is there any status at all within PVL? Is there any way that you gain status and 
reputation? Like, for instance, in my business as an attorney, you know, I gain i 
reputation by being a good attorney, and achieving results. Is there anything like 
that in PVL? Is there anything that would give you nay [sic] kind of status within 
PVL? 
A. Just the like all the fighting and stuff. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Just the stuff you do. 
Q. So the more that you do or the braver you are or the more aggressive you are, 
that gives you status? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. You've been in there for like four years? 
A. Yeah. 
(R. 234:306-309.) 
1? 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should reverse the District Court's ruling that evidence concerning 
High's participation in unrelated gang fights, and evidence that members of PVL gain 
status through violence, was admissible under Utah R. Evid. 404(b). 
A trial court abuses its discretion when it admits evidence under Rule 404(b) 
without conducting a "scrupulous examination," which requires that the District Court 
determine 1) whether the evidence is offered for a proper, non-character purpose; 2) 
whether the evidence is relevant; and 3) whether the probative value of the evidence is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 
2000UT59,6P.3dl l20. 
In this case, the District Court's examination of evidence concerning High's 
violent gang activities did not meet the requirements of Nelson-Waggoner. The District 
Court conducted an extremely limited analysis of the non-character purpose of the 
evidence, and conducted no analysis of the evidence's probative value and potential for 
unfair prejudice. This evidence was highly prejudicial, and there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury would have returned a different verdict if the evidence had been 
excluded. Thus, the District Court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO 
CONDUCT A SCRUPULOUS EXAMINATION UNDER UTAH R. EVID. 
404(B) ' • - * 
The District Court abused its discretion by admitting character evidence 
concerning High's participation in unrelated gang fights, and evidence that members of 
n 
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PVL gained status through violence, because the District Court failed to scrupulously 
1 
examine this evidence under Utah R. Evid. 404(b). When considering whether to admit 
evidence under Rule 404(b), the District Court is required to conduct a scrupulous 
examination of the evidence, which includes a determination 1) whether the evidence is I 
offered for a proper, non-character purpose; 2) whether, pursuant to Rule 402, the 
evidence is relevant; and 3) whether, pursuant to Rule 403, the probative value of the 
evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. State v. Nelson-
Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, 6 P.3d 1120; see also State v. Ferguson, 2011 WL 923943 
(awaiting publication). i 
a. The "scrupulous examination" standard 
When considering whether to admit evidence under Rule 404(b), the trial court is 
required to conduct a "scrupulous examination" of the evidence. Nelson-Waggoner, 
2000 UT 59, 6 P.3d 1120. The defendant in Nelson-Waggoner was charged with five 
counts of rape and tried separately for each count. 2000 UT % 6. The State identified ten 
factual similarities in each of the five rapes charged. IcL at f 3. At the trial on the second 
rape, the trial court permitted testimony under Rule 404(b) of two of the defendant's 
other alleged victims, who testified that the defendant had raped them under factually 
similar circumstances. Id. at ff 9-13. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held that the trial court was required to 
conduct a "scrupulous examination" of the evidence in the exercise of its discretion. Id. 
at | 16. A scrupulous examination, the Court held, required a determination 1) whether 
the evidence was offered for a proper, non-character purpose such as those specifically 
1A 
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listed in Rule 404(b); 2) whether the evidence met the requirements of Utah R. Evid. 402; 
and 3) whether the character evidence met the requirements of Utah R. Evid 403. Id at 
1118-20. 
The Court held that the trial court conducted a scrupulous examination and 
admitted the evidence in the proper exercise of its discretion. First, the Court held that 
the trial court thoroughly determined that the evidence was offered for a proper, non-
character purpose. Id at f^f 21-25. In conducting its examination, the trial court 
determined that the other alleged victims could not testify unless the State could 
demonstrate that each rape about which testimony would be offered included at least six 
of the ten factual similarities identified by the State. Id at f 23. When this requirement 
was met, the trial court further ruled that the testimony of the other victims was 
admissible because it tended to negate the defendant's argument that the victims 
consented to intercourse, which the trial court properly deemed to be a non-character 
purpose for presenting the evidence. Id at ff 23-25. 
Second, the Court held that the trial court conducted a proper analysis under Utah 
R. Evid. 402. Id at fflf 26-27. The evidence tended to establish lack of consent, one of 
the two elements of the crime of rape, and the only issue at trial. Id at % 27. Thus, the 
Court held, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the evidence 
was relevant. Id. at f 27. 
Third, the Court held that the trial court conducted a proper analysis under Utah R. 
Evid. 403. Id at fflf 28-31. The Court applied the factors recommended by State v. 
Shickles. 760 P.2d 291, 295-296 (Utah 1988), in making this holding. Id 
1 ^ 
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The Court held that the most important Shickles factors in the case were "the 
similarities between the crimes" and "the interval of time that has elapsed between the 
crimes." Id^ at |^ 29. There were significant similarities, the Court held, between the 
various rapes allegedly committed by the defendant. Id at % 29. Furthermore, the time 
between all of the incidents was only ten weeks. Id. at If 29. Other Shickles factors also 
showed that the probative value of the bad acts evidence was not substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id. at f 29. Thus, the Court held, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the evidence was admissible. Id 
b. The District Court failed to adequately determine whether High's unrelated, 
violent gang activities were offered for a proper, non-character purpose 
In the present case, the District Court admitted testimony, over High's objection, 
that High had previously participated in gang fights as a member of PVL that were 
unrelated to the crimes charged, and that members of PVL gained status through violent 
actions. (R. 234:306-309.) Prior to this testimony, High argued in a sidebar conference1 
that the State should not be permitted to introduce the testimony on the grounds of Rule 
404(b). (R. 234:305-306.) 
The sidebar conference was conducted off the record, but High made a record of 
the sidebar conference during his motion for a mistrial at the close of evidence. (R. 
234:358-368.) 
1
 We note that the parties alerted the District Court of the need for a ruling on the 
admissibility of this evidence well before this sidebar conference. See Defendant's 
Demand for Utah Rules of 404(b) Evidence, R. 63-62; Plaintiffs Reply Re: Demand 
Regarding 404(b) Evidence, R. 199-167; Argument on the First Morning of Trial, R. 
233:11-12; Argument on the Second Morning of Trial, R. 234:269-272. 
i £ 
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The record of the sidebar conference reveals that the District Court failed to 
conduct a scrupulous examination of the evidence under Rule 404(b). First, the District 
Court failed to thoroughly examine whether the evidence was offered for a proper, non-
character purpose. The substance of the District Court's determination on this point was 
limited to the following statement: 
The State of Utah was not aware whether or not these defendants were going to be 
called as witnesses. Ultimately they were. Does any of this information go to 
motive, knowledge, intent or identity? It does. Okay, if you wish to draft a jury 
instruction relative to that issue, you're welcome. 
(R. 234:367-368.) 
The District Court's bare conclusion that the evidence was relevant for a non-
character purpose does not meet the requirements of Nelson-Waggoner. The District 
Court failed to identify factual similarities between High's prior actions in unrelated gang 
fights and the assault alleged at trial, or give any other indication how evidence of these 
prior bad acts would serve a permissible non-character purpose. See State v. Marchet 
2009 UT App 262, fflf 39-46 & n. 9, 219 P.3d 75 (affirming admission of testimony of 
other alleged crimes under Rule 404(b) where trial court identified factual similarities 
between the alleged crimes and isolated similarities which were particularly probative to 
the issues in the case). 
Furthermore, the District Court did not explain how evidence that members of 
PVL gained status in the gang through violent actions would serve a permissible non-
17 
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character purpose. Thus, the District Court failed to adequately examine whether the 
evidence was offered for a proper, non-character purpose. 
c. The District Court failed to conduct an analysis of the probative value and 
prejudicial effect of High's unrelated, violent gang activities 
Second, the District Court failed to conduct any analysis under Rule 403 relating 
to the evidence of High's unrelated, violent gang activities as a member of PVL. The 
District Court did not apply the Shickles factors, or make any comment on the potential 
prejudicial effect of this evidence. 
The prejudicial effect of High's testimony regarding prior participation in 
unrelated gang fights, and evidence that members of PVL gained status through violence, 
substantially outweighed the probative value of this evidence. At trial in the present case, 
there were essentially two issues for the jury: 1) the credibility of High and co-defendant 
Cristobal versus the credibility of the State's witnesses, Desi and Emilio Maciel; and 2) 
High's relationship with Cristobal and the other unidentified participant in the alleged 
assault. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-202 and 76-9-101. 
Evidence of High's participation in unrelated gang fights as a member of PVL, 
and evidence that members of PVL gain status through violence, was highly prejudicial 
as to the credibility issue. Credibility was important throughout the trial. See Statement 
of Relevant Facts, supra. Since both Desi Maciel's credibility and High's credibility 
2
 The District Court conducted an analysis under Rule 403, using the factors articulated in 
State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986), in determining whether to admit evidence of 
High's prior third-degree felony conviction. (R. 234:259-269.) However, the District 
Court made no such analysis in determining whether evidence of High's unrelated, 
violent gang activities as a member of PVL should be admitted. 
1Q 
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were substantially questionable, it is reasonably likely that inadmissible evidence 
regarding High's involvement in unrelated, violent gang activities tipped the scales of 
credibility in the State's favor, and affected the jury verdict. 
Furthermore, evidence of High's participation in unrelated, violent gang activities 
was not relevant to this issue of High's relationship with co-defendant Cristobal and the 
other unidentified participant. At the point that this evidence was offered and objected to, 
the State had already established that someone yelled the letters "PVL" at the end of the 
alleged incident, that PVL was a gang, that High had a PVL tattoo on his hand, and that 
both High and co-defendant Cristobal had been members of PVL. (R. 234:303-305.) 
While the evidence to that point was probative of the relationship between High 
and Cristobal, and also probative of their alleged collusion in carrying out the alleged 
assault, see U.S. v. Brown, 200 F.3d 700 (10th Cir. 1999) (Gang affiliation admissible to 
show the relationship between two persons where the relationship is a central issue), 
evidence of High's involvement in unrelated, violent gang activities with PVL was not 
probative of High's relationship with Cristobal or any motive for an assault on Desi and 
Emilio Maciel, particularly since Desi and Emilio Maciel were not gang members. (R. 
234:345.) 
Additional evidence of High's involvement in unrelated, violent gang activities 
merely established that High had a propensity for committing violent, gang-related 
crimes, and it is reasonably likely that this inadmissible evidence influenced the jury to 
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believe that High had a propensity for committing violent crimes, and affected the 
ultimate verdict.3 
An application of the Shickles factors also demonstrates that the prejudicial effect 
of evidence concerning High's participation in unrelated, violent gang activities 
substantially outweighed any probative value. See Shickles, 760 P.2d at 295-296. 
Although the evidence of High's participation in those activities was strong, being High's 
testimony from his own knowledge, there was no evidence presented as to the similarities 
between the assault alleged at trial and High's participation in unrelated gang fights or 
violent actions to gain status within PVL. Nor was there any evidence presented as to the 
interval of time elapsed between these other bad acts and the assault alleged at trial. 
Furthermore, evidence concerning these other bad acts was unnecessary, since it 
was not probative of the relationship between High and co-defendant Cristobal or any 
other issue at trial. And, most of all, evidence that High had a propensity for engaging in 
3
 See e.g. U.S. v. Harris, 587 F.3d 861 (7th Cir. 2009) ("Evidence of gang membership 
can be inflammatory, with the danger being that it leads the jury to attach a propensity for 
committing crimes to defendants who are affiliated with gangs or that a jury's negative 
feelings toward gangs will influence its verdict. Guilt by association is a genuine concern 
whenever gang evidence is admitted." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); 
U.S. v. Irvin, 87 F.3d 860 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[W]e have also long recognized the 
substantial risk of unfair prejudice attached to gang affiliation evidence, noting that such 
evidence is likely to be damaging to a defendant in the eyes of the jury and that gangs 
suffer from poor public relations." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); State 
v. McDaniel 777 N.W.2d 739 (Minn. 2010) ("[gang expert] testimony must be carefully 
monitored by the district court so that the testimony will not unduly influence the jury or 
dissuade it from exercising its independent judgment." (citation omitted)); Utz v. Com., 
505 S.E.2d 380 (Va. App. 1998) (recognizing that "evidence identifying a defendant as a 
member of a gang may be prejudicial, since juries may associate such groups with 
criminal activity and improperly convict on the basis of inferences as to the defendant's 
character"). 
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violent gang activities had a high probability of rousing the jury to overmastering 
hostility. See supra n. 3. 
The District Court did not conduct a scrupulous analysis under Rule 404(b) of 
evidence concerning High's unrelated, violent gang activities. It failed to adequately 
determine whether the evidence was admissible for a proper non-character purpose, and 
also failed to conduct an analysis of the probative value and prejudicial effect of this 
evidence under Rule 403.4 Furthermore, the erroneous admission of this prejudicial 
evidence was not harmless because it reasonably affected the ultimate verdict. Thus, the 
District Court abused its discretion in determining that the evidence was admissible under 
Rule 404(b). 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
High asks this Court to reverse the District Court's overruling of his objection to 
evidence regarding his prior participation in gang fights as a member of PVL, and 
evidence that members of PVL gain status through violence, and grant High a new trial. 
4
 In addition to ruling that evidence concerning High's violent gang activities was 
admissible under Rule 404(b), the District Court also ruled that High opened the door to 
character evidence concerning his violent gang activities because he chose to testify at 
trial when there was evidence that he had yelled the letters "PVL" at the conclusion of the 
alleged assault, and evidence that he had the letters "PVL" tattooed on his hand. (R. 
234:366.) The basis for this ruling was unclear, as the District Court did not cite to the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. It seems clear, at least, that High did not open the door under 
Rules 404-405, as he was not a reputation or opinion witness, and did not testify as to his 
own character for violence. See State v. Leber, 2009 UT 59, flj 20-23, 216 P.3d 964. 
0 1 
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UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, RULES 402-405 
RULE 402. RELEVANT EVIDENCE GENERALLY ADMISSIBLE; 
IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of 
the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by 
other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible. 
RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF 
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
RULE 404. CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE 
CONDUCT; EXCEPTIONS; OTHER CRIMES 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character 
is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular 
occasion, except: 
(a)(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an 
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of character of 
the alleged victim of the crime is offered by the accused and admitted under Rule 
404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the accused offered by the 
prosecution; 
(a)(2) Character of alleged victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the alleged 
victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or 
evidence of a character trait of peacefiilness of the alleged victim offered by the 
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the first 
aggressor; 
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(a)(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in Rules 
607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case 
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses 
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to 
introduce at trial. 
(c) Evidence of similar crimes in child molestation cases. 
(c)(1) In a criminal case in which the accused is charged with child molestation, evidence 
of the commission of other acts of child molestation may be admissible to prove a 
propensity to commit the crime charged provided that the prosecution in a criminal case 
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses 
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to 
introduce at trial. 
(c)(2) For purposes of this rule "child molestation" means an act committed in relation to 
a child under the age of 14 which would, if committed in this state, be a sexual offense or 
an attempt to commit a sexual offense. 
(c)(3) Rule 404(c) does not limit the admissibility of evidence otherwise admissible under 
Rule 404(a), 404(b), or any other rule of evidence. 
RULE 405. METHODS OF PROVING CHARACTER 
(a) Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of 
character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or 
by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into 
relevant specific instances of conduct. 
(b) Specific instances of conduct. In cases in which character or a trait of character of a 
person is essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made of 
specific instances of that person's conduct. 
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